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Abstract
According to the standard imitation protocol, a less successful player adopts the strategy of the more
successful one faithfully for future success. This is the cornerstone of evolutionary game theory that explores
the vitality of competing strategies in different social dilemma situations. In our present work we explore the
possible consequences of two slightly modified imitation protocols that are exaggerated and gradual learning
rules. In the former case a learner does not only adopt, but also enlarges the strategy change for the hope
of a higher income. Similarly, in the latter case a cautious learner does not adopt the alternative behavior
precisely, but takes only a smaller step towards the other’s strategy during the updating process. Evidently,
both scenarios assume that the players’ propensity to cooperate may vary gradually between zero (always
defect) and one (always cooperate) where these extreme states represent the traditional two-strategy social
dilemma. We have observed that while the usage of exaggerated learning has no particular consequence on
the final state, but gradual learning can support cooperation significantly. The latter protocol mitigates the
invasion speeds of both main strategies, but the decline of successful defector invasion is more significant,
hence the biased impact of the modified microscopic rule on invasion processes explains our observations.
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1. Introduction
There are several update rules which are used in
evolutionary game theory where different strategies
compete within the framework of a social dilemma
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. In case of birth-death protocol,
for instance, a player is chosen from the entire pop-
ulation proportional to fitness and its offspring re-
places a randomly chosen neighbor [7]. Alterna-
tively, in death-birth updating an actor is chosen
to die randomly and surrounding neighbors com-
pete for the available site proportional to their fit-
ness. In the best-response dynamics the frequency
of a strategy increases only if it is the best response
to the actual state [8]. Further possibilities are the
so-called win-stay-lose-shift move [9, 10, 11, 12] and
the aspiration-driven update when a player’s will-
ingness to change depends on a predefined threshold
value [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
Beside these, the most frequent microscopic dy-
namics is the celebrated imitation rule where a
player may adopt the strategy of a neighbor de-
pending on their payoff difference. The popularity
of the latter protocol is based on the fact that not
only biological systems but also human behavior
can be modeled realistically by this rule [19, 20, 21].
One of the inspiring observations of previous stud-
ies was that the evolutionary outcome may de-
pend sensitively on the applied microscopic dynam-
ics [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28].
Motivated by this phenomenon, in the present
work we study how the final solutions change if we
slightly modify the standard imitation rule. This
question was also inspired by the fact that accurate
strategy imitation of a partner is not necessarily a
realistic approach in several cases. For example,
one can easily imagine a situation when a player,
who witnesses the success of a competitor player,
does not simply copy the attitude of the other, but
tries to surpass the other’s behavior for an even
higher income. But we can also give examples for an
alternative player’s approach. In the latter case a
careful player is reluctant to execute drastic change
from the original strategy. Instead, this actor makes
just a minimal step toward the targeted strategy via
Preprint submitted to Chaos Solitons and Fractals September 27, 2019
the update process.
The above mentioned modified imitation scenar-
ios are studied in the framework of a spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma game where cooperator and defec-
tor strategies compete. According to the dilemma
the latter strategy provides higher individual in-
come for a player independently from the other’s
choice while by choosing the former strategy simul-
taneously competitors would gain a higher mutual
income.
Evidently, to adjust the strategy change in dif-
ferent ways involves a multi-strategy system where
players can choose not only from two options. This
can be easily done if we allow actors to choose in-
termediate levels of cooperation by assuming con-
tinuum of strategies between the two extremes [29].
For easier numerical treatment we propose a spatial
prisoner’s dilemma game with discrete strategies in
order to reveal the possible consequence of inaccu-
rate imitation protocols. Hence, instead of the infi-
nite number of continuous strategies, we introduce
N intermediate discrete strategies between the al-
ways defector and always cooperator strategies. In
this setup the above described protocols are feasible
because players’ strategy can change gradually.
In the next section we provide the details of our
models that is followed by the result section where
we present all observed consequences of the mod-
ified imitation rules. In the last section we dis-
cuss their potential implications and some future
research directions are also given.
2. Gradual propensity level for cooperation
Starting from the traditional spatial prisoner’s
dilemma we assume that players are arranged on
a spatial graph where every player interacts with
their neighbors and gains payoff according to the
prisoner’s dilemma parametrization. Initially we
present results obtained on L× L square grid with
periodic boundary conditions, but the key obser-
vations are also verified on other graphs includ-
ing highly irregular scale-free network and random
graph that exhibits small-world character.
Without loss of generality we assume that the
mutual cooperation pays R = 1 reward for both
players, while a defector player gains 1 < T < 2
temptation value against a cooperator where the
latter sucker’s payoff is S = 0. Finally, mutual pun-
ishment leads to P = 0 individual income. As it was
earlier demonstrated this so-called weak prisoner’s
dilemma parametrization can capture faithfully the
key character of a social dilemma [30].
In the traditional setup the imitation dynamics
during an elementary Monte Carlo step is the fol-
lowing. First, a randomly selected player x hav-
ing strategy sx acquires its payoff Px by playing
the game with all its neighbors determined by the
interaction graph. After, a neighbor y is cho-
sen randomly whose Py calculated similarly. Last,
player x adopts the strategy sy from player y with
a probability determined by the Fermi function
W = 1/{1+exp[(Px−Py)/K]}, whereK determines
the uncertainty of proper imitation [1]. Evidently,
if K is high, the imitation happens randomly while
in the K → 0 limit the update is deterministic
and happens only if Py exceeds Px. According to
the standard simulation technique each full Monte
Carlo step gives a chance for every player to change
its strategy once on average.
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Figure 1: Coarse grained profile to characterize players’
propensity to cooperate. Here we use N + 2 discrete strate-
gies where the intermediate N strategies covers the whole
(0, 1) interval uniformly. In particular, a player represented
by p0 always defects, while a player belonging to pN+1
class always cooperates. In case of an intermediate strat-
egy a player from pi class cooperates with a probability
(i− 1)/N < p < i/N .
In our present work there are two significant dif-
ferences from the traditional model. First, the pro-
posed learning protocols can only be executed if we
assume that players’ propositions to cooperate with
others go beyond the traditional two-state setup.
In particular, we consider that beside the uncon-
ditional cooperate and unconditional defect states
a player may cooperate with a certain p probabil-
ity. Instead of the infinite number of continuous
strategies we assume that players can be classified
into N + 2 discrete classes. As Fig. 1 illustrates,
beside the traditional p = 0 (always defect) and
p = 1 (always cooperate) cases we introduce N
additional strategies distributed uniformly in the
2
(0, 1) interval. For example when a player adopts a
strategy belonging to i-th intermediate class then it
cooperates with others with a probability pi, where
(i− 1)/N < pi < i/N . Importantly, if pi and pj are
from the same [(i−1)/N, i/N ] interval then player i
and j are considered to belong to the same strategy
class.
In the following we study two conceptually dif-
ferent imitation protocols. In the first case when a
strategy update is executed, a player i, whose strat-
egy belongs to the pi class, does not imitate the pj
strategy of player j directly. Instead player i’s new
strategy belongs to the class of pj+1 if j > i or
the new strategy belongs to the class of pj−1 when
j < i. This protocol describes a situation when a
learner tries to go beyond the ”master” by exceed-
ing latter’s strategy choice. In this way a learner
hopes an even higher income from the strategy up-
date. Evidently, if j = N + 1 for j > i then player
i accepts pN+1 strategy. Similarly, when j < i and
j = 0 then player i adopts p0 strategy. As an im-
portant technical detail, when a player adopts an
intermediate strategy class j then its new pj value
is generated randomly from the [(j−1)/N, j/N ] in-
terval. In this way we can avoid that the initial
distribution of pi values influences the final evolu-
tionary outcome artificially.
According to the alternative imitation protocol
the learner player is more careful. Practically it
means that when player i changes strategy in re-
sponse to the success of player j then player i’s
new strategy is pi+1 if j > i or pi−1 if j < i. In
other words, player i is reluctant to change its at-
titude and follows player j only in a minimal way.
Similarly to the previous protocol when an update
is executed then a new pi value is generated from
the new interval. We must note that in both cases
in the N = 0 limit we get back the traditional two-
strategy model, while for large N values the strat-
egy change can be modified smoothly.
For the shake of appropriate comparison with the
results of traditional model obtained previously we
use K = 0.1 noise level, but our key observations
remain intact for other noise values [31, 32]. When
square lattices were used the linear size was ranged
from L = 100 to L = 6400. In case of random
graph the same k = 4 degree distribution was in-
troduced for proper comparison [33], where the typ-
ical system contained 6 · 105 players. Similarly, for
the scale-free graph we kept the average k = 4 de-
gree where typical system size was comparable to
the random graph. Importantly, in the scale-free
network case we applied degree-normalized payoff
values to avoid the additional effect of highly het-
erogeneous interaction graph [34]. As it was shown
previously for the traditional two-strategy model,
when payoff values are normalized by the degree
of each player then the average cooperation level
decreases drastically and becomes comparable to
those values obtained for regular graphs and co-
operators cannot survive for T ≥ 1.1 temptation
values [35, 36, 37].
3. Results
Before presenting the results of modified imita-
tion protocols, it is important to stress that the in-
troduction of multi-strategies to the original model,
where not just the extreme but also intermediate
strategies compete, do not modify the evolutionary
outcome. If a learner player follows the teacher’s
strategy accurately during the imitation process
then the system will gradually terminate onto the
classic two-strategy state where multi-strategies be-
come redundant. This phenomenon is nicely illus-
trated in the animation provided in [38]. Here the
initial state contains 22 strategies (N = 20) and the
temptation value is T = 1.02. Different strategies
are denoted by different shade of red and blue as in-
dicated on the top of Fig. 2. Accordingly, the deep
red marks always defect (p0) strategy, while deep
blue marks always cooperate (p21) strategy. When
the evolution is launched a coarsening process starts
and intermediate strategies die out eventually. Fi-
nally only the two extreme strategies survive who
form a stable coexistence and provide an fC ≈ 0.4
cooperation level in agreement with the result of
the traditional model [31]. Evidently, if temptation
value is increased then the fraction of cooperators
decays and they cannot survive above T = 1.038.
In the following we compare the consequences of
modified imitation protocols by using the same pa-
rameter values (N = 20 and T = 1.2). Figure 2
highlights that the evolutionary outcomes are strik-
ingly different. When the strategy change is en-
larged we started the evolution from a state when
only the middle strategies, p10 and p11 are present.
This case is illustrated in the top row from panel (a)
to (c). As panel (b) shows, the extreme strategies,
such as p0 and p21, emerge at very early stage of
the evolution. Due to the character of the imitation
rule intermediate strategies drift toward the edges
of profile interval leaving only extreme strategies
alive. At such a high temptation level, however, the
3
0 1p
d e f
a b c
Figure 2: Front propagation for N = 20, T = 1.2 by using
the suggested imitation protocols. Strategies are represented
by different colors from deep red (full defection) to deep
blue (full cooperation) as indicated. Top panels from (a)
to (c) show how the system evolves from two intermediate
strategies in case of exaggerated learning protocol. When
we launch the evolution from the mentioned prepared ini-
tial state the extreme strategies appear very soon and the
system evolves to the traditional two-strategy model. Here,
due to high temptation value, full defectors prevail. Bot-
tom panels from (d) to (f) show the evolution when gradual
learning is applied. Here the initial state contains only the
extreme strategies, but the system gradually evolves into a
homogeneous state where players willingness to cooperate is
significant. The system size is L = 100 for both cases.
two-strategy model terminates into a full defector
state as shown in panel (c). The related animation
starting from the prepared initial state to the fi-
nal absorbing state can be seen in [39]. Based on
this the final conclusion can be summarized as the
following. Because of the specific feature of exag-
gerated imitation rule intermediate strategies can-
not coexist long and players gradually adopt the
extreme strategies. From this point the final out-
come is basically determined by the relation of the
always defect and the always cooperator strategies.
In other words, the modification form accurate im-
itation to exaggerated strategy change does not al-
ter notably the results observed for the traditional
two-strategy model.
The impact of gradual imitation rule, however,
is significantly different. This case is illustrated in
bottom row of Fig. 2. Initially, plotted in panel (d),
only extreme strategies are present. When the evo-
lution is launched, intermediate strategies emerge
and they gradually invade the homogeneous ex-
treme domains. We observed that full defector is-
land is more sensitive and shrinks faster than coop-
erator domain. This stage is illustrated in panel (e).
Interestingly, intermediate strategies invade each
others, too, and finally only a single strategy sur-
vives, which provides an average fC = 0.4 coopera-
tion level for the whole population. The final state
is shown in panel (f) and the related animation of
the whole process can be seen in [40].
One may raise that the final destination may de-
pend sensitively on the initial state. Of course this
effect is relevant when the available initial strate-
gies are limited and they span only a finite interval
of the whole [0, 1] profile. For instance, if we ap-
ply the initial state used in panel (a) in Fig. 2 then
the system is unable to leave these strategies be-
cause of the character of the gradual imitation rule.
But this effect becomes irrelevant if extreme strate-
gies are present initially, no matter other strategies
are absent first. This phenomenon is illustrated in
Fig. 3 where we plotted the time evolution of strat-
egy distribution for two different cases. In the first
case, plotted in panel (a), all possible strategies are
present uniformly in the initial state. Later strate-
gies die out gradually, first those who are close to
the extreme strategies. Finally, only a single strat-
egy survives and the system terminates onto an ab-
sorbing state.
 10 0
 10 1
 10 2
 10 3
 10 4  0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
pi
(a)
P(pi)
time [MCS]
 10 0
 10 1
 10 2
 10 3
 10 4
 10 5  0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
pi
P(pi)
(b)
time [MCS]
Figure 3: Time evolution of strategy distributions started
from a uniform state, shown in panel (a), and from a two-
state initial state where only extreme strategies are present,
shown in panel (b). In both cases gradual imitation rule is
applied and the system terminates into a homogeneous state
where pi ≈ 0.4. The linear size of square greed is L = 800
and the same T = 1.2 temptation value is used for both
cases.
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When the evolution is launched from the state
contains only the extreme strategies then the sys-
tem also terminates into an absorbing state where
only a single strategy prevails. This process is
shown in Fig. 3(b), where the number of available
strategies gradually increases and after the evolu-
tion of strategy-distribution becomes similar to the
above discussed case.
Naturally, the fixation interval, means which
strategy survives in the end, may depend slightly
on the system size. This is true especially for small
system sizes and large N values. This effect is il-
lustrated in Fig. 4 where we plotted the average
of final cooperation levels in dependence of system
size for both previously mentioned initial states.
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Figure 4: Average cooperation level of final states in depen-
dence of system size when the evolution is launched from a
uniform and a two-strategy initial state on a square lattice.
This plot suggests that the large size limit can be reached
more easily when only extreme strategies are present in the
initial state. Similarly to Fig. 3 here T = 1.2 and N = 20
were applied. Results are averaged over 200 independent
runs.
Here we have averaged the cooperation levels of
final states over several independent runs by us-
ing the same system size at fixed temptation value
where the initial state was either uniform or two-
strategy state of extreme strategies. This compar-
ison suggests that albeit the fixation values tend
to the same level in the large-scale limit, but the
convergence in the two-strategy case is much faster.
Practically, in the latter case we can obtain the val-
ues valid in the large size limit already at L = 1000
linear size.
In the following we present our key observation
about the impact of gradual learning protocol ob-
tained on square lattice interaction graph. As Fig. 2
already signaled, the application of this strategy
update rule can elevate the cooperation level in
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Figure 5: Cooperation level in dependence on temptation
parameter on square-lattice for different values of N as indi-
cated in the legend. Arrow indicates the highest temptation
value where cooperators can survive in the traditional two-
strategy model. Lines are just guide to the eye. Linear
system sizes are L = 1000.
a population. This effect is confirmed by Fig. 5
where we summarized the cooperation level in de-
pendence of temptation parameter for different N
values. These plots suggest that gradual learning
is beneficial for cooperator strategies and the sup-
porting mechanism becomes more visible for large
N values. Since large N involves just a tiny step
toward teacher’s strategy, hence we can conclude
that the more careful strategy change is applied, the
stronger cooperation supporting effect is reached.
To estimate properly this remarkable effect, in this
plot we have also marked by an arrow the critical
temptation value where cooperators die out in the
traditional two-strategy model.
We have also checked the robustness of this effect
on other kind of interaction graphs. By leaving the
translation invariant symmetry of lattice structures
we first study a random graph which exhibits small-
world character. To allow fair comparison with the
results of square lattice we used the same k = 4
degree distribution for each node [33]. Figure 6,
where our results are summarized, suggests that
similarly high cooperation supporting effect can be
observed, hence our observation is not restricted to
lattice structures, but can also be detected for ran-
dom graphs.
Last, we present our results obtained for scale-
free interaction graphs. This topology represents a
separate class of graphs where the degree distribu-
tion of nodes is highly heterogeneous [41]. To avoid
additional effect, here we keep the k = 4 average
degree level and normalize the players’ payoff by
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Figure 6: Cooperation level in dependence on temptation
parameter on random graph where we used the same k = 4
degree number as for square lattice. The applied N values
are marked in the legend. Lines are just guide to the eye.
Systems contain 6.4 · 105 players and results are averaged
over 20 independent runs.
their degree value. In this way we can detect the
pure impact of gradual learning protocol on coop-
eration level without disturbed by the predominant
impact of accumulated payoff values on strongly
heterogeneous graph [34]. The results, summarized
in Fig. 7, highlight that heterogeneous degree distri-
bution does not block the positive impact of gradual
learning. On the contrary, the highest improvement
can be detected here. For example, cooperators sur-
vive already for N = 3 case in the whole T interval,
where learning is less gradual. Furthermore, play-
ers remain mostly in cooperator state even for high
T = 2 value in the large N limit.
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Figure 7: Cooperation level in dependence on temptation
parameter on scale-free networks where 〈k〉 = 4 is applied
for different values of N as indicated in the legend. Lines
are just guide to the eye. Systems contain 105 players and
results are averaged over 50 independent runs.
Previous works revealed the highly asymmetric
way of strategy propagation for cooperator and de-
fector strategies in spatial systems [1, 35, 42, 43].
While defectors invade their neighborhood fast and
easily, the alternative strategy needs to build up
a ”phalanx” of cooperators [44], which is a slower
process. Since the gradual learning strategy update
rule may modify these dynamical processes, it is in-
structive to explore its direct consequences on the
mentioned propagation courses.
For this reason we used a prepared initial state
where only extreme defector and cooperator strate-
gies form separate domains and monitored the front
propagation speed by measuring the domain growth
of dominant strategy. We have repeated it at differ-
ent N values by using two characteristic temptation
values. In the traditional model T = 0.9 provides
a clear dominance for cooperators while T = 1.1
ensures that defectors prevail. Using these as refer-
ences we can measure how mentioned domains grow
for different N values. As we already noted, the us-
age of different N means different level of gradual
learning protocols. In this way we can compare di-
rectly how the introduction of intermediate strate-
gies modify the invasion process.
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Figure 8: Invasion speed of dominating strategies compared
to the value of the classic two-strategy model in dependence
of the number of inner competing strategies. During the
imitation process players apply gradual learning. In case of
T = 0.9 cooperation, while for T = 1.1 defection prevails
when competition is released.
In Figure 8 we compare how the speed of inva-
sions changes for the two characteristic temptation
values by increasing the number of intermediate
states. Note that N = 0 corresponds to the tra-
ditional two-strategy model therefore the plotted
v/v(0) represents the relative change of invasion
speed. As expected, the introduction of gradual
learning will decelerate the propagation processes
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for both cases. In other words, both the propaga-
tion of successful defector state and successful co-
operator state will slow down. However, there is
significant difference, because the modified learn-
ing protocol hinders the propagation of defection
more efficiently. This biased impact on propaga-
tions explain why a strategy-neutral update rule
has a cooperator supporting net consequence on the
competition of strategies.
This argument is in nice agreement with our
previous observations because the fastest invasion
of defector state was previously reported in het-
erogeneous graphs. Since gradual learning proto-
col blocks this propagation efficiently therefore the
largest increment in cooperation level can be ex-
pected for such interaction graphs.
4. Conclusion
Motivated by previous reports about microscopic
dynamics sensitive outcomes of evolutionary pro-
cess in present work we have explored the possible
consequences of modified imitation rule protocols.
Instead of accurate adoption we have introduced
exaggerated and gradual imitation rules. While in
the former protocol a learner enlarges the strategy
change between the learner’s and master’s strate-
gies, in the latter protocol the learner makes only a
minimal step toward master’s strategy during the
update process. The former choice can be inter-
preted that the learner wants an even higher pay-
off than the one collected by the master player.
The latter protocol mimics the situation when the
learner is more careful and is reluctant to make
drastic strategy change. These protocols can only
be executed if we introduce a multi-strategy sys-
tem where intermediate level of cooperation is also
possible.
We have observed that the exaggerated update
protocol has no particular role on the evolution-
ary process and eventually the system terminates
onto the traditional two-strategy model where only
always defect and always cooperate players are
present. The gradual learning protocol, however,
may influence the evolution significantly. If we
make the strategy change tiny by introducing large
number of intermediate strategies then the coopera-
tion level can be elevated remarkably. We note that
a conceptually similar observation was made in [45]
where the authors introduced a weighted average as
the way to update investments.
We have demonstrated that the cooperation sup-
porting mechanism of gradual learning can be ex-
plained by a biased impact on strategy propagation
process. Indeed, gradual learning decelerates the
invasion for both main strategies, but the block-
ing of defector invasion is more effective. In this
way a strategy-neutral microscopic rule has a bi-
ased impact on the competition of strategies. We
note that this observation fits nicely to the gen-
eral concept when there is a non-trivial conse-
quence of a neutral intervention on strategy evo-
lution [46, 12, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51].
Our observations are robust and remain valid
by using different types of interaction graphs. No
matter translation invariant lattice, or random, or
highly heterogeneous topology is used, the positive
consequence of the gradual learning protocol is re-
markable. We note, however, that similar coopera-
tor supporting effect is expected on interdependent
or multilayer networks [52, 53, 54, 55, 56]. This ex-
pectation is based on previous results which already
highlighted the decisive role of propagation process
in such complex networks [57, 58].
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